This article straddles a dubious boundary between philosophy and sociology. The subject of the book is the sociology of knowledge, and, from the title, it should be understood that reality is socially constructed.
The point of this is a surprising and powerful argument against introverted approaches to philosophy, suggesting that the deep philosophical questions of “what is real” and “what is meaningful” depend not on transcendental truths, but on communities of individuals. Along the way, the authors describe some progressive arguments regarding the processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. His approach to the book is to think of it from the perspective of models and how people imagine and perceive systems. As such, his focus is primarily on the topic of the construction of reality and the objective reality of society.
It should be noted that
the book was published originally in 1966, and many of the attitudes and
positions the book is being used to challenge are less dominant now.
Particularly, this is the case with the transcendental philosophy of knowledge
that is criticized early on.
Introduction: The Problem of the Sociology of
Knowledge
This book is an approach
to reality and knowledge that is in contrast with (and challenges) the
philosophical dominance and interpretation of the problems of knowledge and
reality. The authors wish to provide some medium between the “man on the
street” view of reality and the perspective of the philosopher. Some of this is
dependent on ideas of what may be taken for granted. For the “man on the
street,” reality is simply there and can be taken for granted. For the
philosopher, nothing may be taken for granted, and it is necessary to question
everything to uncover fundamental and eternal truths. The role of the
sociologist is to challenge these views and assert that meaning occurs to
people, and is dependent on the group who is perceiving reality. The sociologist
knows that different groups have different perceptions, but these perceptions
must be acknowledged (instead of being questioned to yield absolute truths).
The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the social construction of
reality. In context, this is a rather bold claim.
Many of the base ideas
of the sociology of knowledge come from German scholars, most notably Max
Scheler (who originated the term), but ideas also come from Marx, who argued
“that man’s consciousness is derived by his social being.” Scheler uses some
specialized terms, notably “ideal factors” and “real factors”. The authors
explain: “That is, the “real factors” regulate the conditions under which
certain “ideal factors” can appear in history, but cannot affect the content of
the latter. In other words, society determines the presence but not the nature
of ideas.” In Scheler’s view, human knowledge and experience is ordered by
society. This order informs how the individual sees the world, and because it
is socially pervasive, it seems natural. This way of looking is the
“relative-natural world view”, a concept which remains very important. It is
important to note how the descriptions used here are about perspective and
views, which are similar to his approach to models. After Scheler, Mannheim and
Talcott Parsons have been heavily influential in the sociology of knowledge.
Deciding scope, the
authors explain that: “The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with
everything that passes for “knowledge” in society.” This is meant to broaden
the focus beyond mere ideas, which is the subject of some other approaches. The
authors challenge the intellectual distance of theory about the formulations of
reality and knowledge. These are far removed from the day to day concerns that
constitute peoples’ realities. The authors take on social reality comes from
George Herbert Mead. The authors see the inquiry as also pushing for a new
direction within the scope of sociology itself, to understand the knowledge and
realities of societies.
The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life
Everyday life is
interpreted: “Everyday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men and
subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world.” The section examines
sociological implications of everyday life. It is inter-subjective, also
empirical, but it is not scientific. Commonsense understandings are
pre-scientific or quasi-scientific, but are functional and pervasive
nonetheless. The authors approach to this is phenomenological. Consciousness
must be understood as intentional. People form attitudes toward things, have
intentions toward them, and understand things through experience and
perception. Understanding of how things work comes from these experiences, and
operates according to causal logic, but is not scientifically accurate. This is
how naive theories of physics become embedded in one’s mind, because they are
reinforced by experience.
Everyday life is
embodied and immanent. It is organized around the “here” of the body and the
“now” of the present. Everyday life may be safely assumed as reality, and this
is a domain of familiarity and experience defining a world of connected
meanings. Things observed are given meanings and fit within the world, so that
they can interact and interrelate with each other. This works until there is
something problematic that does not fit into the model. The response for
dealing with something problematic is to attempt to integrate it, to fit it
into the model so that it is not problematic anymore. Another solution, although
it is not really discussed, is to broaden the model. Problems seem to lie on
the separate and incompatible nature of different realities. The authors
describe everyday life as paramount, but I disagree, as reality and domain
shifts (a stepping out) may be a part of everyday life. Different realities, in
this sense, are domains such as theatre or religious ceremony.
Face to face
interactions are extremely real in that they are very present in the here and
now. However, interactions are made more distant through the application of
categories and functional understandings (a bank teller, a European, a
stranger). As such, these lead to further degrees of anonymity as a person
becomes less understood as an individual and more as a category. This, essentially,
makes the other less real, at least in the sense of interaction. By contrast,
in interactions that are intimate and face to face the individual becomes
immediately important and generalizations are less powerful. This illustrates
another sense in which anonymity can be constructed, and leads to a
dehumanization. This level of distancing is also important in online
interactions, as well as with characters in games. This suggests that a way to
encourage identity is to create a sense of the here and now within the social
context.
Signs, and by extension
language, have the power to be detached from their context. When recorded, a
sign indicates some meaning that was, at some point, belonging to a moment, a
“here and now.” The sign becomes something that can be removed from its context
and carried elsewhere, where it can be observed and understood without the
original moment.
The stock of knowledge
shapes areas of reality based on the parts of everyday life that one must deal
with frequently. The world is structured in routines, all of which are fine
until something problematic emerges. The world has its own logic, and is
structured according to relevances. Relevances depend on interaction and have
social value and meaning. The world of one’s reality is not simply a single
unit that exists in detachment, but it is shared, or at least it overlaps with
the worlds of others, because everyday life is a shared phenomenon.
Society as Objective Reality
This chapter is
concerned with the existence of the institution and how reality is understood
objectively in the social context. The argument is reminiscent of Foucault,
that institutions form rules and interpretations for understanding; the
discourse of an institution is enclosing. The social world leads to habitualization,
and gradually, habitualization gives way to institutionalization. Humans are
naturally world-open, in that they can shift from one world of meaning to
another with relative ease. However, institutions are closed, in the sense that
the world of meaning communicated by an institution is encompassing and shuts
out other worlds. The authors introduce world-closedness earlier in the
chapter, in discussion of the worlds of animals, which are limited and cannot
be extended or opened to anything else (although animal play might contradict
this somewhat). The authors summarize the objective view of society: “Society
is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.”
Institutional
development involves the formation of logic, but this is not uniform or
individually determined. Logic is social and shared. Individuals take part in
an institution by developing biographies that are consistent with the system.
(This resonates with Holland, as well as Denzin). Roles enable the self to be
understood objectively (a la Mead), and are performed (a la Goffman). Roles
enable objectification on the count of others, to enable oneself to be
percieved as a type or a category, rather than as an individual. Types are
necessarily interchangeable (a la Marx?). Roles represent and embody the social
order, and are formed by the sameprocess of institutionalization.
Symbolic universes are a
level of legitimization of an institution. The authors explain that these
universes are products of a gradual objectification, sedimentation, and
accumulation of knowledge (p. 97). Their meaning comes from their history.
Symbolic universes order and categorize biographic and institutional knowledge.
PETER BERGER AND
LUCKMANN
Chapter 1
●
Purpose- sociological analysis of the reality of
everyday life. Only tangentially interested in how this reality appears in
theoretical perspectives, more interested by how its reality is available to
the common sense of the ordinary members of society. But, this common sense
understanding may be influenced by theoretical perspectives. Thus, the author’s
enterprise may be theoretical in character but its subject matter (world of
everyday life) is empirical.
●
Everyday life presents itself as a reality that
is interpreted by men and is subjectively meaningful to them. This reality can
be taken as a given without inquiring into its foundations. But, this world
originates in the thoughts and actions of men and is maintained by these, which
means that an inquiry into its foundations is necessary.
●
The method best suited to clarify these
foundations is that of phenomenological analysis- descriptive method but
empirical not scientific.
●
It is common sense that contains many pre and
quasi scientific interpretations about everyday life and to describe the
reality of everyday life, these interpretations must be considered.
●
Consciousness is always intentional; it also
intends to be or is directed towards objects. These objects can be experienced
as belonging to the external physical world or perceived as an element of an
inward subjective reality, like anxiety. What is of importance is the common
intentional character of all consciousness.
●
Different objects present themselves to
consciousness as constituents of different spheres of reality. When our
consciousness moves from one sphere of reality to another, we experience it as
a kind of shock. This shock is understood as being caused by a shift in
attentiveness (like the shift that occurs when we wake up from a dream)
●
Among the multiple realty, one asserts itself as
the paramount reality or the reality par excellence (forces the person to be
attentive to it in the fullest way possible) This is the reality of everyday
life, which we experience through a state of being wide-awake. We take this
reality as normal.
●
This reality of everyday life is also
apprehended as being an ordered reality. Its phenomena are prearranged in
patterns that are independent of our understanding of them, it thus appears to
be already objectified. Language provides us with the necessary objectifications
and posits the order within which these make sense.
●
The reality of everyday life is also organized
around the ‘here and now’ of the body of an individual. But this does not mean
that it is exhausted by just immediate presences but it also embraces phenomena
that are not present in the ‘here and now’. Thus, we experience everyday life
in varying degrees of closeness, both spatially and temporally. Closest to us
is the zone of everyday life that is directly accessible to our bodily manipulations
(world within our reach). This zone is dominated by the pragmatic motive (what
I am doing, have done or will do) so it becomes the world par excellence. But
reality of everyday life also has zones that are not accessible in this manner,
may have no pragmatic interests or interest in them is only indirect
(potentially can be manipulated). For example, for a mechanic, the first zone
will be his own garage, directly accessible and manipulated by him. The second
will be his interest (though not as direct) in the work done in the automobile
industry of Detroit since it can affect his everyday life and he may also have
some interest in what’s going on in outer space but this interest will be part
of his ‘leisure time’ rather than an urgent necessity in everyday life.
●
The reality of everyday life is also presented
as an intersubjective world, which means that it is a world shared by others.
This is what differentiates it from other realties since we are alone in the
world of our dreams but the world of everyday life is real to everyone. Thus,
the reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality.
●
But it is not completely unproblematic. Reality
of everyday life is divided into sectors that are apprehended routinely and
others that present with some problems. To continue the example of a mechanic,
let’s say I am only familiar with American cars. Everything to do with American
cars then becomes routine for me and is an unproblematic facet of my everyday
life. But if someone comes to me with a Volkswagen, then I will be compelled to
enter the problematic facet of foreign made cars, which are not routine for me.
To face this problem doesn’t mean that I leave the reality of everyday life but
rather, the reality of my everyday life will become more enriched as I incorporate
knowledge about foreign made cars into it. Thus, the reality of everyday life
incorporates both sectors (problematic and unproblematic) as long as what is
problematic doesn’t correspond to a different reality altogether.
●
Compared to the reality of everyday life, other
realities are finite provinces of meanings. They are merely enclaves within the
paramount reality, consciousness always returning back to the paramount reality
(dreaming). Similar commutations take place between the world of everyday
reality and the world of play. Play of adults- theatre. Rising of curtain
transports, you to another reality, perhaps with different meanings but you’re
always brought back to the paramount reality of everyday life when the curtain
falls. However, the reality of everyday life maintains its paramount status
even as you turn your attention away to these finite provinces. This is because
the language used to interpret meanings of these finite provinces is still
grounded in everyday life which means that when it is used for such
interpretations, it leads to distorted meanings.
●
It is important here to look at the temporal
structure of the world of everyday life.
●
Our consciousness is ordered temporally and it
is possible to distinguish between different levels of temporality since it is
inter-subjectively available. (available to different people which leads to
different levels of it)
●
There can never be full simultaneity between
these different levels of temporality, as is shown by waiting. If I want to
take part in a race, but my knee is bruised then I must wait for it to heal.
●
This implies that we must synchronize our own
projects with the temporal structure of everyday life.
●
We encounter this temporal structure as
continuous and finite, continuous because our existence is continuously ordered
by its time and finite because of the knowledge of our inevitable death.
●
This structure is also coercive. We cannot
reverse the sequence of events it imposes on us (must pass exams before getting
a degree, must get a degree to get a job)
●
This structure also determines my historicity
since I was born at a particular date, enrolled in school at a particular date
etc. But, these dates are also part of a more comprehensive history of the
world, which shapes my situation. Thus, if I was born on a date that was during
the recession which led to my dad losing his job which obviously affected me.
So the structure doesn’t just affect my day to day but affects my entire
biography.
●
It is because of this temporal structure that everyday
life maintains its status as paramount reality.
Chapter 2
●
The reality of everyday life is shared with
others. The question then arises that how we experience these others in
everyday life. The author differentiates between several modes of such
experience.
●
The most important way in which we experience
others is through face-to-face interactions, in which a vivid present is shared
by both the parties. Both their ‘here and now’ continuously impinge on each
other as long as the face-to-face situation continues. As a result, there is a
continuous interchange of expressivity (both their expressions are oriented to
each other)
●
This interchange implies that the other’s
subjectivity is available to the person through a maximum number of symptoms
(like expressions).
●
Relations with others in a face-to-face
situation are also highly flexible. This means that it is difficult to impose
rigid patterns on such interactions. Even the patterns that are introduced will
be continuously modified through the subtle interchange of subjective meanings
that goes on during FTF interactions. For example, if I view another person as
unfriendly, then I will act towards him within a pattern of ‘unfriendly
relations’ but when I meet him FTF, he may show attitudes and acts that
contradict this pattern. Thus, the pattern cannot sustain the massive evidence
of the other’s subjectivity that is available FTF.
●
On the other hand, one may apprehend the other
by means of typificatory schemes even in FTF interactions. While it is
comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns on FTF interactions, even these
are patterned from the beginning if they take place within the routines of
everyday life.
●
The FTF interactions will then be patterned by
these typifications as long as they do not become problematic through
interference on the other’s part. (if he perceives the typification to be
wrong) At this point, the typification will then need to be modified but if not
challenged, they hold and determine actions.
●
These typificatory schemes are of course
reciprocal. (the other will also typify) and these are also as susceptible to
interference.
●
The two typifictory schemes thus enter into a
‘negotiation’ in FTF interactions. This negotiation is itself likely to be
prearranged in a typical manner (like the bargaining between buyers and
salespeople)
●
So encounters with other become typical in two
senses- you apprehend the other as a TYPE, and the situation in which you
interact with the other is itself typical.
●
The typifications of social interactions become
progressively anonymous the further away they are from FTF situations. An
important aspect of the experience of others in everyday life is then the
directness and indirectness of such experience. It is thus possible to
distinguish between associates who you interact with FTF, others who are merely
contemporaries and still others who you know by merely hearsay. Anonymity
increases when you go from the former to the latter because the anonymity of
the typification by means of which one apprehends people in FTF situations
reduces because it is filled in by the multiplicity of symptoms that show a
concrete human being and not an anonymous type.
●
The degree of anonymity depends on another
factor too. Degree of interest and degree of intimacy combine to decrease or
increase anonymity of the situation. (you see the newspaper vendor at the
corner of your office as every day and you see your mother also everyday but
the vendor stays more anonymous to you because no interest or intimacy with
him)
●
Finally, anonymity may become total with certain
typifications that are not intended to ever become individualized- “typical
reader of Times of India”
●
Social reality of everyday life is thus
apprehended in a continuum of typifications, which become progressively
anonymous as they are removed from the ‘here and now’ of FTF.
Chapter 3
LANGUAGE & KNOWLEDGE IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Language has its origins in the face-to-face
situation, but can be readily detached from it. This is not only because I can
shout in the dark or across a distance, speak on a telephone or via the radio,
or convey linguistic signification by means of writing… The detachment of
language lies much more basically in its capacity to communicate meanings that
are not direct expressions of subjectivity “here and now”. It shares this
capacity with other sign systems, but its immense variety and complexity make
it… readily detachable from the face-to-face situation… I can speak about
innumerable matters that are not present at all in the face-to-face situation,
including matters I never have and never will experience directly. In this way
language is capable of becoming the[intersubjective] repository of vast accumulations of meaning
and experience, which it can then preserve in time and transmit to following
generations.
This text is itself an
example.
In the face-to-face situation language possesses
an inherent quality of reciprocity that distinguishes it from any other sign
system. The ongoing production of vocal signs in conversation can be
sensitively synchronized with the ongoing subjective intentions of the
conversants. I speak as I think; so does my partner in conversation. Both of us
hear what each says at virtually the same instant, which makes possible a
continuous, synchronized, reciprocal access to our two subjectivities, and
intersubjective closeness in the face-to-face situation… What is more, I hear
myself as I speak; my own subjective meanings are made objectively[sic] and continuously available to me and ipso
facto become “more real” to me… The capacity of language to crystallize and
stabilize for me my own subjectivity is retained (albeit with modifications) as
language is detached from the face-to-face situation…
Language originates in and has its primary
reference to everyday life; it refers above all to the reality I experience…
and which I shared with others in a taken-for-granted manner… I encounter
language as a facticity [that appears to be] external to myself and it is coercive in its
effect on me. Language forces me into patterns. I cannot use the rules of
German syntax when I speak English; I cannot use words invented by my
three-year-old son if I want to communicate outside my family; I must take into
account prevailing standards of proper speech for various occasions… Language
provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my
unfolding experience…
Because of its capacity to transcend the “here
and now” language bridges different zones within the reality of everyday life
and integrates them into a meaningful whole. The transcendences have spatial,
temporal and social dimensions. Through language I can transcend the gap
between my manipulatory zone and that of [an] other; I can synchronize my biographical
time sequence with his; and I can converse with him about individuals and
collectivities with whom we are not at present in face-to-face interaction…
Language builds up semantic fields or zones of
meaning that are linguistically circumscribed. Vocabulary, grammar and syntax
are geared to the organization of these semantic fields. Thus language builds
up classification schemes to differentiate objects by “gender”… or by number;
forms to make statements of action as against statements of being; modes of
indicating degrees of social intimacy, and so on… Within the semantic fields…
it is possible for both biographical and historical experience to be
objectified, retained and accumulated. The accumulation, of course, is
selective, with the semantic fields determining what will be retained and what
“forgotten” of the total experience of both the individual and the society. By
virtue of this accumulation a social stock of knowledge is constituted, which
is transmitted from generation to generation and which is available to the
individual in everyday life. I live in the commonsense world of everyday life
equipped with specific[sets] of
knowledge. What is more, I know that others share at least part of this
knowledge, and they know that I know this. My interaction with others in
everyday life is, therefore, constantly affected by our common participation in
the available stock of knowledge.
The social stock of knowledge includes knowledge
of my situation and its limits. For instance, I know that I am poor and that,
therefore, I cannot expect to live in a fashionable suburb. This knowledge… [can be] shared both by those who are poor themselves
and those who are in a more privileged situation. Participation in the social
stock of knowledge thus permits the “location” of individuals in society and
the “handling” of them in the appropriate manner [sic].
In other words, people
in society treat each other differently, have different expectations of others,
dependent on their various statuses (e.g. we treat men and women differently,
people of different occupational statuses differently, etc) and being aware of
the cultural knowledge, which comes through language as the means of
communication that allows culture, i.e. shared objectivations, is what enables
people who share that language/culture to behave in culturally acceptable ways
toward one another, where a foreigner or a space alien (e.g. Mork) would not
already the different expectations.
Since everyday life is dominated by the
pragmatic motive, recipe knowledge, that is, knowledge limited to pragmatic
competence in route performances, occupies a prominent place in the social
stock of knowledge. For example, I use the telephone everyday for pragmatic
purposes of my own. I know how to do this. I also know what to do if my
telephone fails to function — which does not mean that I know how to repair it,
but that I know whom to call on for assistance. My knowledge of the telephone
also includes broader information… I know that some people have unlisted numbers…
All of this telephonic lore is recipe knowledge since it does not concern
anything except what I have to know for my present and possible future
pragmatic purposes. I am not interested in why the telephone works… in the
enormous body of scientific and engineering knowledge that makes it possible…
nor am I interested in uses of the telephone that lie outside my purposes…
I encounter knowledge in everyday life as
socially distributed, that is, as possessed differently by different
individuals and types of individuals. I do not share my knowledge equally with
all my fellowmen, and there may be some knowledge that I share with no one…
Knowledge of how the socially available stock of knowledge is distributed, at
least in outline, is an important element of that same stock of knowledge. In
everyday life I know, at least roughly, what I can hide from whom, whom I can
turn to for information on what I do not know, and generally which types of
individuals may be expected to have which types of knowledge.
— Berger & Luckmann, p.37-46
Berger & Luckmann
begin here to move from the epistemological to the sociological, showing how
closely related the two are through language and as manifest in people having
different stocks of knowledge, structured by their position in the networks of
social relations and by their position in time relative to earlier generations.
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